Abstract-In this paper, we study the problem of secret key generation with one-way communication, where in addition to the rate limited public channel, which can be observed by both Bob and Eve, we add a secure channel, which only connects Alice and Bob. In this model, we do not pose any constraints on the sources, i.e. Bob is not degraded to or less noisy than Eve. We propose an achievability scheme, and we also suggest a converse, which meets the achievability. Therefore, we obtain the secret key capacity for this model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key generation was introduced by Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] and Maurer [2] , where two separate terminals, named Alice and Bob, observe the outcomes of a pair of correlated sources separately and want to generate a common secret key, which is concealed from an eavesdropper Eve, given that the terminals can communicate through a noiseless public channel which the eavesdropper has complete access to. In [1] , the secret key capacity of correlated sources was characterized when Alice and Bob are allowed to communicate once over a channel with unlimited capacity. The secrecy key capacity was found by Csiszár and Narayan [3] when there is a constraint on the rate of the public channel.
In this paper, we consider the problem of secret key generation with one-way communication, where in addition to the rate limited public channel, which can be observed by both Bob and Eve, we add a secure channel, which only connects Alice and Bob. One of the motivations of this problem comes from wireless sensor network with fading channels, where the nodes want to share a secret key to encrypt their communication. In this scenario, the frequency selectivity of the fading channels will create both public and secure channels. More specifically, in some frequency bands, the links from Alice to both Bob and Eve are of good qualities, which constitute the public channel. In some other frequency bands, the link from Alice to Bob is of good quality, but the link from Alice to Eve is basically broken. These frequency bands can be viewed as a secure channel. Another motivating example comes from [4] , where Alice and Bob are nodes equipped with multiple antennas and they want to communicate to share a secret key with the help of multiple single-antenna relays employing the amplify-andforward strategy. We assume that some relays are "nice but curious" [5] which can be viewed as Eve, while the other relays are simply nice. Therefore, the links through the curious relays are public, while the links through the nice relays are secure. Our problem can be viewed as a special case of the problem of secret key generation from correlated sources with the broadcast channel introduced in [6] , where Alice, Bob and Eve are connected by a one-way broadcast channel and they observe the outcomes of correlated sources separately which are independent of the channel. This problem in general is very difficult, because it is hard to identify the optimal strategies to combine the two resources, the channel and the sources, to generate a secret key between Alice and Bob. Therefore, the secret key capacity in this problem remains unknown in its general form. Achievability schemes and converses have been proposed in [7] , [8] . However, these achievabilities and converses in general do not meet.
There are few special cases where the secret key capacities have been obtained, including: 1) Eve is degraded with respect to Bob for both source and channel [7, Th.3] , 2) Eve is "less noisy" than Bob for either the source or the channel [8, Prop.1, 2] , where the model is degenerated into wiretap channel or key generation problem , and 3) Bob is "less noisy" than Eve for both source and channel [8, Prop.3] .
As a special case of the secret key generation with broadcast channel problem, our model is not covered by any above existing special cases, where achievability and converse meet, because while the public and secure noiseless channels in our model can be viewed as a degraded broadcast channel, i.e., Eve's channel is degraded with respect to Bob's channel, we do not pose any constraints on the sources, i.e. Bob is not degraded to or "less noisy" than Eve. In this new non-trivial special case, we propose an achievability scheme, and we also suggest a converse, which meets the achievability. Therefore, we obtain the secret key capacity for this special case.
There are some other existing works related to our problem. For example, secure communication over fading channels with-out the correlated sources [9] , wiretap channel with non-causal channel state information available at Alice [10] , and wiretap channel with shared key between Alice and Bob [11] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND MAIN RESULT
Consider a network with three nodes, including a transmitter Alice, a receiver Bob and an eavesdropper Eve. We assume three discrete memoryless sources indicated by random variables (X, Y, Z), defined in the alphabets (X , Y, Z), respectively. We assume that Alice and Bob observe the n-length source sequences X n and Y n , respectively, and Eve observes n-length source sequence Z n . A key generation code consists of two encoding functions f 1 and f 2 and two decoding functions g 1 and g 2 , defined as follows:
Here,
is sent through the public channel and
is sent through the secure channel. Then the secret key K is generated by Alice and Bob from the functions g 1 and g 2 , respectively, which should agree with probability 1 and be concealed from Eve. The probability of error for the key generation code is defined as P
A secret key rate R K with constraint communication rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is achievable if for any > 0 there exists a key generation code such that
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
where random variables (U, T, X, Y, Z) satisfy the following Markov chain
III. THE CONVERSE
We begin the proof of the converse with
where (14) follows from Fano's inequality; (15) follows from the secrecy constraint in (6) . By applying the key identity [12, Lemma 17.12] , it follows that
where
Here, J is uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , n} and independent
, we can replace Y J and Z J by Y and Z. Then (10) is proved.
Then we consider the sum rate (R 1 + R 2 )
where (19) 
with U as defined in (18) and J is uniform on {1, 2, . . . , n}. Finally, for the public rate R 1 , we have
By the similar argument as in the sum rate derivation, we have
where T as defined in (17) and J is uniform on {1, 2, . . . , n}, which concludes the proof of the converse.
IV. THE ACHIEVABILITY
The achievability scheme that we propose in this paper can be viewed as a combination of the scheme in secret key generation from correlated sources [3] , consisting of a codebook of the superposition structure, and secret key distribution through secret channel.
The rate of the public channel and the secure channel are used for the transmission of the following: 1) the inner code T n . 2) the outer code U n . 3) key distribution. Our proposed scheme follows the principles below:
• The public channel is used to transmit the inner code T n . Since the rate of the inner code is less than the rate of the public channel, then the leftover rate of the public channel will be used to transmit the outer code U n .
• The secure channel is used to transmit the outer code U n . Since there is still extra rate leftover in the secure channel, then the leftover rate of the secure channel can be used for key distribution.
• The public channel can not be used for key distribution and the secure channel can not be used to transmit the inner code T n .
We show that the proposed scheme achieves the rate in Theorem 1 and is thus, optimal. For the completeness, the details of the proof can be found in the appendix.
V. DISCUSSIONS
We first elaborate on the principles of the proposed scheme in the previous section. Since distributing key through public channel will compromise the confidentiality of the key, the public channel can not be used for key distribution. Regarding the principle where the secure channel does not transmit the inner code, from the proof of the achievability in the appendix, we will find that the conditional distribution P T |X for the inner code satisfies
which means, Eve can obtain extra knowledge about T n from Z n than what Bob gets from Y n . This extra knowledge means that though part of T n is transmitted through the secure channel, it is not secure because Eve can infer this secure part of T n from her observation of Z n . Regarding the principle that for the rate of the secure channel, the transmission of the outer code gets higher priority than key distribution, we explain by comparing our proposed scheme with the separation-based scheme, where the public channel is used for key generation and the secure channel is used for key distribution. The secret key rate of the separation-based scheme is
Comparing the above secret key rate to the secret key rate in Theorem 1, we find that the expressions for the secret key rate R K are the same for both schemes, but the constraints on the public and secure rates are stricter for this separationbased scheme, which results in a smaller value of the term I(U ; Y |T ) − I(U ; Z|T ), and therefore a smaller secret key rate in this separation based scheme. The reason is that in the separation-based scheme, the secure channel is only used for key distribution. Therefore, every bit of the secure channel rate gives one bit of secret key rate. However, for the proposed joint scheme, which is optimal, the secure channel is used to transmit the outer code. Every bit through the secure channel for the outer code remains secure to the eavesdropper, and therefore yields one bit of secret key rate. In addition, one bit of the outer code through the secure channel helps in the scheme of key generation by delivering one more bit to Bob, which gives a larger secret key rate. We conclude that every bit that we increase on R 2 can contribute in two different aspects in the joint scheme and yield more than one bit of the increase in secret key. Hence, the proposed joint scheme outperforms the separation based scheme. This explains why, for the rate of the secure channel, the transmission of the outer code gets higher priority than key distribution. Based on the discussion of the above paragraph, we conclude that when fixing R 1 , every bit increased in R 2 will provide more than one bit of secrecy key rate. Next, consider the case where the sum rate R 1 + R 2 is fixed. We note that increasing R 2 will improve the optimal R K because we can always use the secure channel as the public channel, which will keep R K the same. Then the optimal scheme will outperform this simple scheme and yield a larger secret key rate. If we look into the expressions in Theorem 1, we can find that increasing R 2 (and therefore decreasing R 1 ), on one hand, will increase the last term R 2 in the expression of R K in (10), but on the other hand, will decrease the first two terms I(U ; Y |T ) − I(U ; Z|T ) of R K in (10) by tighten the constraint on the distribution in (12) . Therefore, we conclude that every bit that we move from R 1 to R 2 will provide no more than one bit of increase on the optimal secret key rate R K .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of key generation from both correlated sources and a secure channel. We found the secret key capacity when there are rate constraints on both the public and the secure channels, by providing the proofs of both achievability and the converse. We showed that the optimal scheme is to use the secure channel for secret key generation and key distribution jointly, in which case every bit in the secure channel can yield more than one bit of secret key. This optimal scheme is better than the separation-based scheme where the public channel is used for secret key generation and the secure channel is used for key distribution, in which one bit in secure channel can only give one bit of secret key.
APPENDIX
Consider a given distribution
We use a separate scheme as follows. Alice use the public channel to achieve a secrecy rate I(U ; Y |T )−I(U ; Z|T ) by the scheme in secret key generation, and use the secure channel to distribute another secret key with rate R 2 . Combine two secret keys together, the secrecy rate in (10) is achievable.
Case 2: If R 1 ≤ I(U : X|Y ).
In this case, we assume that I(T ; Y ) ≤ I(T ; Z). The reason is that if I(T ; Y ) > I(T ; Z), we define a pair of new random variable (U , T ) such that U = (U, T ) and T = ∅. Then we have I(T ; Y ) ≤ I(T ; Z). From the three inequalities in the main theorem, we have
The above derivation shows that for every pair (U, T ) with Markov chain T → U → X and I(T ; Y ) > I(T ; Z), we can find another pair (U , T ) with Markov chain T → U → X and I(T ; Y ) ≤ I(T ; Z) such that the rate region with (U , T ) is achievable implies that the rate region with (U, T ) is also achievable. Therefore, we only need to consider the case where
We define the following notations 1) Find the unique sequence t n (ŝ 1 ) ∈ B 1 (m 11 ) such that (t n (ŝ 1 ),
. And the probability that there is no such sequence or there are more than one such sequences is arbitrarily small if
2) Find the indexŝ 2 ∈ B 2 (ŝ 1 , m 12 , m 21 ) such that (t n (ŝ 1 ), u n (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ),
. Let B 2 (ŝ 1 , m 12 , m 21 ,k 1 ) be the bin index of u n (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ). The probability that there is no such sequence or there are more than one such sequences is arbitrarily small if
